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CASE COMMENTS
cision upon an ancient doctrine, which in common law was not applied
to criminal matters, the court did not undertake the evaluation
necessary to determine the reasonableness of the search.
Education is fundamental to a democratic society, but it becomes
vacuous if those being educated are also denied their rights. An
appreciation of basic civil rights can only be learned in an environ-
ment where such rights are rigorously protected. In the words of
Justice Jackson:
That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship
is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source
and teach youth to discount important principles of our government
as mere platitudes.59
RANDALL O. REDER
Wills and TrustS-TRUST INSTRUMENT PROVIDING FOR PAYMENT OF
ESTATE TAXES IS INSUFFICIENT To AVOID APPLICATION OF FLORIDA
APPORTIONMENT STATUTE, ABSENT ExPREss PROVISION IN TESTATOR'S
WILL-Guidry v. Pinellas Central Bank and Trust Co., 310 So. 2d 386
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
On May 4, 1972, Henrik Ovesen created a revocable inter vivos
trust naming Pinellas Central Bank and Trust Company [hereinafter
Pinellas Bank] as trustee.' Reserving the income to himself for life,
Ovesen directed that his wife, Emilie, was to receive the income at his
death. After the death of Ovesen and his wife, the trustee was to set
up two trusts. From the first, Ovesen's daughter, Emilie Erslev, was
to receive income for life, remainder to Mellon National Bank and
Trust Company [hereinafter Mellon Bank] as trustee for a family
foundation. 2 From the second, his granddaughter, Patricia Guidry,
was to receive income for life. Upon her death both income and
principal were to be distributed for her children's educational needs,
if any.3 The excess was also to be distributed to the Mellon Bank for
the family foundation.
59. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943), quoted in
Buss, supra note 33, at 792.
1. Guidry v. Pinellas Central Bank and Trust Co., 310 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
2. Id.
3. Id. The trust provided that the trustee was "authorized to distribute income and
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Mr. Ovesen directed Pinellas Bank, as trustee of the inter vivos
trust, to pay all inheritance, legacy, succession, or transfer taxes imposed
upon his estate by reason of his death. His stated purpose was that all
devisees, legatees, and beneficiaries of his will or insurance contracts
should receive their interests without diminution.4
On May 31, 1973, after the creation of the trust, Henrik Ovesen
executed a will bequeathing his entire probate estate to his wife, with
Pinellas Bank as executor. The will included no provision for the pay-
ment of estate taxes.5 Thereafter Ovesen's only named beneficiary, his
wife, predeceased him. At his death, his probate estate, augmented by
his wife's sizeable estate, passed under Florida's intestacy statute to
his heirs at law.6 Ovesen's granddaughter, Patricia Guidry, and Mellon
Bank as trustee of the family foundation, refused to permit Pinellas
principal for the educational needs; if any, -of Patricia Guidry's children who may not
have attained twenty-three years of age at the time of her death." Id.
4. Id. Paragraph I(C) of the trust instrument provided:
The Trustee shall pay to the Executor or Administrator of the Donor's estate
from the principal of this trust such sums as the Executor or Administrator
shall request in writing for the purpose of paying the expenses of the Donor's last
illness, funeral expenses and expenses of administration of said estate, any other
valid obligation of the Donor existing at Donor's decease, and all inheritance,
legacy, succession or transfer taxes imposed by reason of the Donor's decease upon
said estate or in respect to any interest therein or in respect to any property
which shall not come into possession of said Executor or Administrator, to the
end (without limiting the generality of the foregoing) that all devisees, legatees
and beneficiaries under the Donor's Will or otherwise, and beneficiaries of in-
surance or other contracts with insurance companies may receive their respective
interests without diminution by reason of any of said taxes, expenses of administra-
tion, debts or other obligations, except as the residue of this trust may be thereby
reduced, and notwithstanding the fact that the Donor's estate may be sufficient
to pay the foregoing. In the Trustee's discretion, it may pay directly any estate
inheritance or other taxes levied as above, and any funeral expenses, debts, or
claims against the estate of the Donor. If the Trustee has not received a written
request for funds to pay taxes, expenses or obligations within eight months of the
date of the death of the Donor, the Trustee, shall not be required thereafter to
hold any assets of this trust for the purpose of paying such sums.
Id.
5. Id. at 388.
6. 310 So. 2d at 388.
When Mrs. Ovesen predeceased her husband, his testamentary bequest to
her lapsed. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.603, .604, and .101 (1975). Lapse "refers to a legacy
or devise which would have taken effect if the testator had died the instant after
he executed the will; but which fails because the devisee or legatee has, in some way,
become incapable of taking under the will between the time that the will was made
and the time that the testator died." 4 W. PAGE, THE LAw OF WILLS § 1413 (3d
(Lifetime) ed. 1941). FLA. STAT. § 732.103 (1975) sets out the distribution of intestate
estates when there is no surviving spouse.
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Bank to pay estate taxes from the corpus of the trust.7 Pinellas Bank
sought a declaratory judgment to authorize it to pay the taxes.,
The issue for the court was whether a donor's direction in a trust
instrument for the payment of estate taxes was sufficient to avoid the
application of the Florida apportionment statute, which required that
estate taxes be apportioned between probate and nonprobate assets
unless the decedent's will directed otherwise." Since Ovesen's direction
7. 310 So. 2d at 388. Due to the inclusion of Mrs. Ovesen's estate in her husband's
estate, the amount required to pay the estate taxes would have depleted the trust. Id.
8. Id.
9. The Florida apportionment statute, Act of May 28, 1965, ch. 65-230, § 1, 1965 Fla.
Laws 539 provided in part:
(1) Any estate, inheritance, or other death tax levied or assessed under the
provisions of the tax laws of this or any other state or political subdivision thereof,
or country or of any United States revenue act, with respect to any property
required to be included in the gross estate of a decedent under the provisions
of any such law, shall be apportioned in the following manner:
(a) If any portion of the estate passed under the will of a decedent as a
specific bequest or devise, or general legacy, or in any other nonresiduary form
(exclusive of property over which the decedent had a power of appointment
as defined from time to time under the estate tax laws of the United States),
the net amount of the tax attributable thereto shall, except as otherwise directed
by the will, be charged to and paid from the residuary estate of the testator
without requiring contribution from persons receiving such interests. In the
event the residuary estate is insufficient to pay the tax attributable to such
interests, any balance of such tax shall, except as otherwise directed by the will,
be equitably apportioned among the recipients of such interests in the propor-
tions that the value of each such interest included in the measure of such tax
bears to the total of all such interests so included.
(c) If any portion of the property with respect to which such tax is levied
or assessed is held under the terms of any trust created inter vivos or is subject
to such a power of appointment, the net amount of the tax attributable thereto
shall, except as otherwise directed by the trust instrument with respect to the
fund established thereby, or by the decedent's will, be charged to and paid
from that portion of the corpus of the trust property or the property subject
to such power of appointment included in the measure of such tax, as the
case may be, and shall not be apportioned between temporary and remainder
estates.
(e) The balance of the net amount of the tax, including, but not limited
to, any tax imposed with respect to gifts in contemplation of death, jointly
held properties passing by survivorship, property passing by intestacy, or
insurance, shall, except as otherwise directed by the decedent's will, be
equitably apportioned among and charged to and paid by the recipients and
beneficiaries of such properties or interests in the proportion that the value
of the property or interest of each included in the measure of such tax
bears to the total value of all such properties and interests included in the
measure of such tax; provided, that where any such property interest is an
interest in income or an estate for years or for life or other temporary
interest, the amount so charged to such recipients or beneficiaries shall not be
1977]
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was not included in the will but was unequivocally expressed in the
trust instrument, strict application of the statute would defeat the
express terms of the trust.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Pinellas Bank on
the theory that the trust instrument was controlling, thus avoiding
application of the apportionment statute. The Second District Court
of Appeal reversed, ruling that the statute controls unless the decedent
specifically directs otherwise in the will.10 The court reasoned that the
apportionment statute "declares that the policy of the state is for death
taxes to be apportioned equitably among the recipients and beneficiaries
of a decedent's property."'" A testator may provide for payment in
another manner, but he must direct such payment in his will. Judge
Boardman dissented; he reasoned that, since decedent's intention was
expressed clearly and unmistakably, it was unnecessary to apply the
statute.12
The rule established by the decision is clear: an uncontradicted
direction in a trust instrument that the trust shall bear the entire
estate tax burden, allowing the testamentary beneficiaries to take un-
diminished by the taxes, will not be given effect to avoid application
of the apportionment statute. However, neither the history of
apportionment statutes in general nor of Florida's in particular man-
date such a literal interpretation of Florida's statute.
State apportionment statutes have long been recognized as a means
of effectuating the decedent's presumed intent.' s Prior to the enact-
ment of such statutes, when the intent of the decedent as to the pay-
ment of estate taxes had not been clearly expressed, the entire tax on
probate and nonprobate assets was deducted from the residue.'1
apportioned between temporary and remainder estates but shall be charged to
and paid out of the corpus of such property or fund.
The provisions of the statute quoted in Guidry are essentially unchanged in the current
version. FLA. STAT. § 733.817 (1975).
10. 310 So. 2d at 389.
The Guidry decision is cited in two recent annotations dealing with this
general area: Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 691, 700 n.45 (1976) (Construction and Effect of
Provisions in Nontestamentary Instrument Relied Upon as Affecting the Burden of
Estate or Inheritance Taxes); Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 247, 307 n.50 (1976) (Construction
and Application of Statutes Apportioning or Prorating Estate Taxes).
11. Id. "[S]tate law should determine the ultimate thrust of the tax [federal and
state transfer taxes on property includable in the taxable estate]." Riggs v. Del Drago,
317 U.S. 95, 98 (1942). See Myers v. Sinkler, 110 S.E.2d 241 (S.C. 1959); In re Will of
Hallinan, 347 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
12. 310 So. 2d at 390.
13. See Lindsay, Florida's Estate Tax Laws-The Need for Compromise, 35 FIA.
B.J. 164 (1961); Note, Statutory Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 62 HAav. L. REv.
1022 (1949); Legislative Notes, New Florida Apportionment of Estate Taxes, 3 U. FLA.
L. Ray. 83, 93 (1950).
14. See YMCA of Columbus v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924); Wells v. Menn, 28 So. 2d
[Vol. 5
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Decedents commonly made specific bequests to family friends and
collateral relatives, leaving the residue to their families. The result
was that the estate tax inequitably burdened "the residuary legatees
who [were], under most wills, the widow and children of decedent."' 1
To alleviate this injustice, New York in 1930 passed the first appor-
tionment statute to provide for the ratable distribution of the tax
burden among the recipients of those assets which gave rise to the
tax.' In 1949, Florida passed an apportionment statute substantially
the same as that enacted by New York. 7 The purpose of this statute
was to place the tax burden on the interests that created the tax.'5
However, collecting these taxes from the individual beneficiaries led
to substantial administrative difficulties, 9 and in 1957, the statute was
amended to provide for the deduction of all "estate, inheritance, succes-
sion, and death taxes" from the residuary estate. 20 This amendment
basically reinstated the common law as it existed before the 1949
statute.2' But in 1963, the legislature enacted an apportionment statute
that has remained essentially unchanged to the present. 22 Under its
provisions, the personal representative may pay all estate taxes out
of the residuary estate with the right to be reimbursed for taxes paid
on nonprobate assets. 23 Thus, the apportionment statute directs the
deduction of taxes on probate assets from the residue, with taxes on
nonprobate assets borne by the beneficiaries of such assets.
By enacting the apportionment statute, the legislature provided
an equitable means of distributing the burden of estate taxes when
the decedent failed to do so. 24 Since the will is the instrument which
generally contains directions as to payment of expenses and debts arising
881, 884 (Fla. 1946); In re Bernays' Estate, 7 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1942); Lindsay, supra note
13, at 164; Note, Statutory Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, supra note 13.
15. Note, Virginia Statute on Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 34 VA. L. REV.
370 (1948).
16. Act of April 23, 1930, ch. 709, § 1, 1930 N.Y. Laws 1283 (current version
at N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.8 (Consol. 1976)). For further history and
development of New York's apportionment statute see Lindsay, supra note 13; Legisla-
tive Notes, New Florida Apportionment of Estate Taxes, supra note 13; 52 N.C. L. REV.
737, 740 (1974).
17. Act of June 13, 1949, ch. 25435, §§ 1-5, 1949 Fla. Laws 1049 (current version
at FLA. STAT. § 733.817 (1975)).
18. See Riggs, Florida Estate Tax Apportionment, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 719, 720 (1973).
19. See Lindsay, supra note 13, at 167-68.
20. Act of May 13, 1957, 1957 Fla. Laws 134, ch. 57-87, § 1 (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 733.817 (1975)).
21. See Lindsay, supra note 13, at 164.
22. Act of May 20, 1963, ch. 63-106, §§ 1-3, 1963 Fla. Laws 180 (current version at
FLA. STAT. § 733.817(3)-(5) (1975)).
23. Id. See Riggs, supra note 18, at 733.
24. See Riggs, supra note 18; Legislative Notes, New Florida Apportionment of Estate
Taxes, supra note 13, at 86.
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because of decedent's death, it was the logical instrument to negate
the application of the apportionment statute. Additionally, inter vivos
trusts were not widely used in estate planning when the statutes were
initially enacted.2 5 The district court of appeal pointed out that there
is a "dearth of decisional law in Florida" on the specific point raised
by this case, though one Florida court has held that where provisions of
a trust and a will conflict, the will prevails.2 6
The district court of appeal in Guidry took the view that the
apportionment statute should be narrowly construed to require
apportionment in all cases "unless the decedent's will directs other-
wise. " 27 One conceivable alternative would have been to read the word
"will" in the statutory phrase "except as otherwise directed by the
decedent's will"2s to include an inter vivos trust-like Ovesen's-con-
taining testamentary provisions. Such an interpretation would have
given express recognition to the special status of inter vivos trusts in
estate planning29 The court did not discuss such an alternative; it
considered the meaning of the statute "plain."2 0
In many instances, such a narrow interpretation may actually defeat
rather than effectuate a decedent's clearly expressed intent. Ovesen
obviously intended that his wife receive his probate assets undiminished
by estate taxes; he created a trust instrument that provided for the
payment of his estate taxes for the express purpose that "all devisees,
legatees and beneficiaries under the Donor's Will or otherwise, and
beneficiaries of insurance or other contracts with insurance companies
may receive their respective interests without diminution by reason
of any of said taxes . 3..."31 But since his sole testamentary beneficiary
predeceased him, his intent as to who should bear the burden of the
taxes-the trust beneficiaries or his heirs at law-was unclear. The court
may have reached the equitable result of effectuating the decedent's
intent as they interpreted it.
The precedent established by the court's narrow interpretation of
the word "will" in the statute could have been avoided. The same
25. For a discussion of the increasing popularity of inter vivos trusts, see Polasky,
"Pour-Over Wills"-'And the Statutory Blessing, 98 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 949 (1959).
26. 310 So. 2d at 389, citing In re Estate of Strohm, 241 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1970).
27. 310 So. 2d at 389.
28. See note 9 supra for the text of the statute.
29. See FLA. STAT. § 689.075 (1975).
30. 310 So. 2d at 388. The court construed the statute (full text in note 9 supra)
to limit "the effectiveness of [Ovesen's] direction under the trust to the trust assets."
310 So. 2d at 389. However, § 734.041(l)(c) (current version at F.A. STAT. § 733.817 (1975))
dealt only with property "held under the terms of any trust created inter vivos"; it did
not deal with the entire gross estate.
31. 310 So. 2d at 387,
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result could have been reached on the theory of effectuating decedent's
intent by reasoning as follows. Since Ovesen designated the beneficiaries
of the trust, while the probate beneficiaries were determined by the
intestacy statute, he would have preferred his designated beneficiaries
to receive a larger share undiminished by estate taxes. By apportioning
the taxes under the statute, the trust corpus is preserved so that the
trust beneficiaries receive the intended benefit. If the taxes had been
paid from the trust, the corpus would have been exhausted and the
settlor's intent frustrated. Thus, by using the apportionment statute,
the specifically named beneficiaries (the trust beneficiaries) receive a
larger proportion of the estate by application of the statute. The court
did not, however, adopt this rationale; it adopted instead a narrow
interpretation of section 734.041-an interpretation that calls for
statutory apportionment whenever the decedent fails to make testa-
mentary provisions in a will for the payment of taxes. 31
The rationale behind a narrow construction is two-fold: to avoid
usurpation of the legislative function 33 and to avoid unnecessary litiga-
tion.3 4 The Guidry court could, however, have given effect to Ovesen's
dispositive plan without incurring either of these risks. A decision in
harmony with legislative intent would not have resulted in judicial
usurpation.3 5 Nothing in the legislative history of Florida's apportion-
ment statute indicates that the legislature considered this particular
conflict when they specified that the statutory apportionment scheme
could be avoided only by will.36 When the apportionment provision
was originally enacted, trust instruments were not widely utilized in
estate planning. Since that time, however, Florida has recognized the
trust as an instrument used in major dispositive schemes both in giving
32. New York's courts, operating under a provision similar to Florida's, have con-
sistently emphasized that apportionment pursuant to the statute will be directed when-
ever there is no clear direction to the contrary in the will. In re Schneider's Estate,
267 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sur. Ct. 1966); In re Bayne's Will, 102 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sur. Ct. 1950);
In re Blumenthal's Estate, 42 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sur. Ct. 1943).
33. In re Barret, 137 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962). See In re Blumenthal's
Estate, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
34. The desire to avoid litigation leads most courts to seek some clear declaration
of intent as to the payment of taxes. Where only a testamentary declaration will suffice,
this problem is obviated. See 62 HARv. L. REv. at 1025 n.31.
35. Legislative Notes, New Florida Apportionment of Estate Taxes, supra note 13,
at 86.
36. The author reviewed documents on file in the Legislative Library Services, Joint
Legislative Management Committee, Florida Legislature. No committee reports prior to
1959 were available. Documents for the period after 1959 did not indicate that the
committees had considered a situation in which a trust instrument provided for apportion,
ment of taxes while the testator's will did not,
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effect to pourover provisions,3 7 and in allowing the retention of powers
by the settlor of the trust.3 8
In addition, since a trust is a relatively sophisticated instrument, it
is rarely drawn without the assistance of an attorney; therefore, the
functions of the Statute of Wills-ritual, evidentiary, and protective-
are satisfied. 39 The process of consultation between attorney and client
and the resulting formulation of a trust instrument assures that the
benefactor is aware of the consequences of his act, that perjury or
forgery are absent, and that the benefactor is free from undue in-
fluence. The ritualistic and evidentiary functions are satisfied by the
writing of the instrument and the delivery of it to the trustee. There-
fore, it is difficult to understand a policy behind the legislature's in-
tentionally leaving only the apportionment of estate taxes as the one
area of estate planning that must be specifically designated in the will.
The ease of changing the burden of estate taxes does not increase the
possibility of undue influence or fraud. The provision in the trust
would tend to be as explicit as in a will. Therefore, in view of the
recent advent of popularity of the inter vivos trust and considering the
lack of any express policy in designating only the will for avoidance
of the statute, the acknowledgment of a nontestamentary plan for the
purpose of tax apportionment would not result in judicial usurpation
of a legislative function.
The Guidry court's fears that giving effect to uncontradicted trust
provisions would spawn unnecessary litigation is unfounded. Only in
37. FLA. STAT. § 733.808 (1975).
38. FL.A. STAT. § 689.075(1) (1975) provides:
A trust which is otherwise valid . . . shall not be held invalid or an attempted
testamentary disposition for any one or more of the following reasons:
(a) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to
revoke, amend, alter, or modify the trust in whole or in part;
(b) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to
appoint by deed or will the persons and organizations to whom the income
shall be paid or the principal distributed;
(c) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to
add or withdraw from, the trust all or any part of the principal or income at
one time or at different times;
(d) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to
remove the trustee or trustees and appoint a successor trustee or trustees;
(e) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to
control the trustee or trustees in the administration of the trust;
(f) Because the settlor has retained the right to receive all or part of the
income of the trust during his life or for any part thereof;
(g) Because the settlor is, at the time of the execution of the instrument,
or thereafter becomes, sole trustee; provided that at the time the trust instru-
ment is executed it is either valid under the laws of the jurisdiction in which
it is executed or it is executed in accordance with the formalities for the
execution of wills required in such jurisdiction.
[V.I. 5
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situations where the decedent has incorporated a clear mandate in a
trust instrument for the payment of estate taxes should statutory
apportionment be avoided. Furthermore, no additional litigation would
result if courts formulate rules to give effect to trust provisions that
conflict with will provisions dependent on which is later in time, again
following the latest expression of decedent's intent. The equity of
following the decedent's clear intent should offset the slight potential
of additional litigation. The Virginia legislature has proved this to be
true by codifying such a provision in its apportionment statute which
gives maximum effect to the testator's intent, and it has not proved
the cause of troublesome litigation.40 Such a statutory revision in Florida
would clearly obviate the Guidry court's dilemma.
For the present, only a testamentary provision for the apportion-
ment of estate taxes will avoid the application of the apportionment
statute in Florida.41 Even a clearly expressed, uncontradicted provision
in a trust instrument will not avoid such application. This construction
must inevitably thwart the intent of many deceased benefactors. This
undesirable result may be resolved in either of two ways: first, by more
liberal interpretation and application of the apportionment statute; or
39. See id.; Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 1955) (allowing a revocable inter
vivos trust which did not comply with the Statute of Wills). See also Flickinger, The
'Pour-Over' Trust and the Wills Statutes; Uneasy Bedfellows, 52 KY. L.J. 731 (1964):
The basic format of the wills statute is to require the testator to describe the
subjects, objects, and conditions of his testamentary bounty by means of a written
document executed with certain formalities. The purpose behind these require-
ments is to provide adequate safeguards to prevent fraud and ensure the accurate
fulfillment of the testator's desires.
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-165 (1950) provides:
But it is expressly provided that the foregoing provisions of this article are subject
to the following qualification, that none of such provisions shall in any way impair
the right or power of any person by will or by written instrument executed inter
vivos to make direction from [sic] the payment of such estate or inheritance
taxes and to designate the fund or funds or property out of which such payment
shall be made; and in every such case the provisions of the will or of such written
instrument executed inter vivos shall be given effect to the same extent as if this
article had not been enacted. (Emphasis added.)
To date few cases involving this statute have been reported. See, e.g., Alexandria
Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 194 S.E.2d 723 (Va. 1973).
41. Failure to explain to the client the importance of including a provision in the
will to avoid the application of the Florida apportionment statute may expose an
attorney who drafts such a trust to malpractice liability. The potential problems have
been discussed in the professional literature: "[t]he equitable and statutory requirement
that estate taxes must be apportioned is controlling even though the decedent has
created an inter vivos trust providing for the payment of all estate taxes from such
trust fund." Legal Questions Under Florida Apportionment Statute, 31 FLA. B.J. 190,
190 (1957). See also THE FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA WILL DRAFTING AND EsTATE PLANNING
793 (2d ed. 1972); Payne, Apportionment of Federal and State Estate Taxes Under
Florida Law, 11 MtAMI L.Q. 265 (1956).
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second, by statutory revision to include apportionment by trust pro-
vision when the will contains no provision for payment of estate taxes
or when the trust provision is the more recent provision. In either
event, the intent of the testator will be better effectuated.
CAROL E. GILMORE
